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REGULATING SHORT SELLING IN EUROPE AFTER THE
CRISIS
Rodolphe B. Elineau*

Abstract
Short selling contributes to the efficient functioning of capital markets.
While bullish investors tend to hold long positions, bearish investors act
on information by shorting stock, thereby fostering the incorporation of
good and bad information into stock prices. Yet short sellers are illviewed by corporate officers, directors, and financial market authorities.
In the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis, several financial market
authorities in the European Union issued emergency orders to crack
down on short sellers, which resulted in a fragmented approach to short
selling and created a case for regulatory action at the European Union
level. This Article reviews the Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on Short Selling and Certain
Aspects of Credit Default Swaps. While the need to shed light on short
selling further supports the need for regulatory action, there appears to be
some cause for concern as “government hubris” might be destructive.

*
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Regulating Short Selling in Europe

“They say ‘there are no atheists in foxholes.’
Perhaps, then, there are also no libertarians in crises.”
James Frankel1

I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Mechanics of Short Selling
Short selling is commonly defined as the practice of selling a
security the seller does not own at the time of the sale. A short seller can
sell a security she does not own using the securities lending market. Two
different strategies might be followed. In a covered short sale, the seller
borrows or makes arrangements to borrow the security prior to the short
sale. Conversely, in an uncovered or naked short sale, the seller neither
borrows nor makes arrangements to borrow prior to the short sale but
borrows and delivers the security to the buyer by the settlement date,
usually three business days after the trade date. In both strategies, the
short seller will close out the position by repurchasing and returning the
same security to the lender.
The definition of short selling laid out in the Regulation on Short
Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (the Regulation)
does not represent a departure from this widely accepted definition.
Under Article 2(1)(b) of the Regulation, a
“short sale” in relation to a share or debt instrument means any
sale of the share or debt instrument which the seller does not
own at the time of entering into the agreement to sell including
such a sale where at the time of entering into the agreement to
sell the seller has borrowed or agreed to borrow the share or debt
instrument for delivery at settlement . . . .2
Likewise, Rule 200(a) of Regulation SHO, which sets forth the
United States's regulatory framework governing short sales, refers to
“any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is

1

James Frankel, Responding to Crises, 27 CATO J. 165, 165 (2007).
2012 O.J. (L 87) 236/2012, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:EN:PDF [hereinafter
Regulation].
2
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consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the
account of the seller.”3
A short seller makes a profit () if she sells the borrowed security
for a price (S) higher than what she pays to return the security to the
lender (R):  = S – R, as shown by the downward sloping curve in the
graph below.

Π max = S’

R’

Profit (Π)
C

S’
S

Share Price
R’’

Loss (Π)

Short Sellers’ Payoff Profile
The downward sloping curve makes it clear that short sellers expect
stock prices to decline. Consider short selling a security for $S. The short
seller will make a profit if she pays less than $S to return the security to
the lender, for example $R’, but suffer a loss if she pays more than $S to
return the security to the lender, for example $R’’. A short seller usually
bears indirect costs (C) such as lending fees paid to the securities lender.
As a consequence, a short seller must be able to cover these costs in
order to earn a profit; that is, pay less than S’ to return the borrowed
security. Here,  = S’ − R, with S’ = S − C.

3

17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2012).
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Short selling is highly risky. The outcome of such trading strategy
relies on stock price evolution, and short sellers have limited upside
potential profit but no downside protection. While the potential profit is
capped at S (or S’), the potential loss is unlimited. Thus, short selling is
much riskier than similar bearish strategies using put options, where both
profits and losses are capped.
B. History of Short Selling and its Regulation
Short selling has always drawn the attention of regulators,
particularly in the European Union. The first regulation on short selling
was enacted in Holland in 1610. One year before in 1609, Isaac Le
Maire, a Dutch businessman, founded a secret association—“Groote
Company”—in order to short the shares of the Dutch East India
Company in anticipation of the incorporation of a new rival French
company,4 sending the company’s price into a plunge. Only eight years
after the founding of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Dutch authorities
outlawed all short sales.
Every crisis has unleashed political disdain for short sellers and
prompted regulators to introduce curbs or outright bans on short selling.
In 1932, Herbert Hoover, then-President of the United States, required an
inquiry into short selling and expressed fears that “destructive short
sellers” were “preventing an economic rebound.”5 In 1997, Crédit
Lyonnais, a French bank, was blamed for short selling after the collapse
of Malaysia’s stock market and currency.6 In the aftermath of the 2008
global financial crisis (the Crisis), critics of short selling are no different.
Regulating short selling, which represents roughly 1 to 3 percent of
market capitalization in Europe,7 remains a stormy debate and a
controversial issue.

4
Arturo Bris, William Goetzmann, & Ning Zhu, Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and
Markets Around the World (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 02-45, 2004).
5
RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 351–52 (Grove Press ed., 2010).
6
Daniel Trotta, Short Sellers Have Been the Villain for 400 Years, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/26/us-financial-shortselling-villainspicsidUSTRE48P7CS20080926.
7
Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps, MEMO/10/409 (Sept.
15, 2010), available at
.http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/409&format=HTML&aged=1
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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C. The E.U. Approach to Short Selling During the Crisis
The European Union’s response to the recent financial crisis was
disorganized and inconsistent across countries. At the height of the Crisis
in September 2008, after the rescue of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers, regulators in several E.U. countries (Member
States) issued temporary emergency orders as they grappled with how to
deal with the Crisis. Indeed, they decided to crack down on bearish short
sellers, which resulted in a fragmented approach to short selling across
the European Union between 2008 and 2009.8 These approaches
included bans on the short selling of financial stocks,9 bans on the short
selling of all listed stocks,10 bans on the naked short selling of financial
stocks,11 bans on the naked short selling of all listed stocks,12 disclosure
of net short positions in financial stocks,13 and disclosure of net short
positions in all listed stocks.14
The approach to short selling was also chaotic within some Member
States, which added a sense of uncertainty to the Crisis that was roiling
in the financial markets. In particular, Italy successively banned (i) naked
short sales of financial stocks from September 23, 2008 to September 30,
2008; (ii) short sales of financial stocks from October 1, 2008 to October
9, 2008; (iii) short sales of all stocks from October 10, 2008 to December
31, 2008; (iv) short sales of financial stocks and stocks of companies
increasing their outstanding share capital from January 1, 2009 to
January 31, 2009; (v) naked short sales of all stocks from January 1,
2009 to July 31, 2009; (vi) short sales of financial stocks and stocks of
companies increasing their outstanding share capital from February 1,
2009 to May 31, 2009; and (vii) short sales of stocks of companies
increasing their outstanding share capital from June 1, 2009 to July 31,
2009.15

8
Seraina Gruenewald, Alexander Wagner & Rolf Weber, Emergency Short Selling Restrictions
on the Course of the Financial Crisis (June 22, 2010)(unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1441236.
9 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Id. at 7–13.
10
Italy and the Netherlands. Id. at 11–13.
11
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom (the “UK”). Id.
9–16.
12
Austria, Greece, and Italy. Id. at 7–11.
13
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. Id. at 8–16.
14
Greece, Hungary, and Spain. Id. at 10, 15.
15
The ban was extended sine die on August 1, 2009. See CONSOB Resolution No. 16971
(July 28, 2009), available at
http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/resolutions/res16971.htm.
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Moreover, these temporary emergency orders might well have been
illegal in some Member States. Particularly, Bonneau argued that the
French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) had no legal authority to
ban short selling activity during the crisis.16 Lawyers tend to think that
issues of legal authority do matter, even in the midst of a severe global
financial crisis, and such a dismissive attitude raised some concern.
D. The E.U. Regulatory Approach in the Aftermath of the Crisis.
During the aftermath of the Crisis, regulatory agencies tried to create
a more consistent approach to short selling. On March 14, 2012, the
Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps
was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The
Regulation aimed at harmonizing the rules applicable to short selling
across the European Union and clarifying the powers of competent
regulators. To that purpose, the European Commission and the European
Parliament used a regulation, which is binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States, as opposed to a directive, which is only
binding as to the result to be achieved and leaves to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods.17 The Regulation is
enforceable throughout the European Union, without the need for further
legal thinking by any Member State. Cooperation between the European
Commission and Member States has been crucial since the Regulation
has been passed by the European Parliament and adopted by the Council
in accordance with the ordinary legislative co-decision procedure.

16
Thierry Bonneau, Crise financière: l'AMF hors la loi... Pour la bonne cause, 5 REVUE DE
DROIT BANCAIRE ET FINANCIER [REV. DR. BANC. FIN.] 12 (2008)(Fr.). The French Banking and
Financial Regulation Act, passed on October 22, 2010, entrusted the French AMF with the legal
authority to prohibit short selling. On August 25, 2011, pursuant to article L. 421-16 of the French
Monetary and Financial Code (Code monétaire et financier), the French AMF banned short selling
of certain financial stocks (April Group, Axa, BNP Paribas, CIC, CNP Assurances, Crédit Agricole,
E.U.ler Hermès, Natixis, Scor and Société Générale). The ban was extended for three months on
November 11, 2011, pursuant to a decree of the French Ministry of Finance. Moreover, article 22337 of the General Regulation of the AMF was amended. This article requires the notification to the
AMF of any net short position that becomes equal or greater than 0.2, 0.3, or 0.4 percent of the
capital of a company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market or traded on an
organized multilateral trading facility. Moreover, any short position that becomes equal or greater
than 0.5 percent must be publicly disclosed, as well as any increments of 0.1 percent.
17
Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 O. J. (C 83) 171-72.
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E. The U.S. Response to the Crisis
In contrast to the European Union’s response, the U.S. Congress did
not address the issue of short selling in a specific law or regulation, nor
did it design a ready-to-use set of rules in the aftermath of the Crisis.
Instead, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given
broad authority to regulate further short sale transactions by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. Particularly,
Section 929X gives the SEC the authority to, inter alia, design new
disclosure requirements and rules necessary or appropriate to ensure that
the appropriate enforcement options and remedies are available against
manipulative short selling. When relevant, this Article will compare the
E.U. and U.S. approaches.
F. Short Selling and Market Efficiency
Short sellers are usually considered to be greedy speculators reaping
the benefits of bearish financial markets at the expense of the general
welfare. In particular, corporate officers and directors are hostile to short
sellers. Richard Fuld, then-CEO of Lehman Brothers, was quoted as
saying, “I will hurt the shorts, and that is my goal.”18 This statement,
made a few months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, gives an
accurate sense of how ill-viewed short sellers are in the corporate
community. Indeed, short selling conveys bad information to the markets
about a particular security, worries long investors, and puts corporate
officers and directors in the hot seat. Corporations often blame short
sellers for their financial woes rather than admit management’s flaws.
Lamont studied the methods used by firms to impede short selling and
prop up their stock price. These methods include soliciting legal actions
from regulatory authorities and disrupting the securities lending markets
to prevent would-be short sellers from borrowing stocks by using
belligerent statements claiming that “short sellers are acting improperly
to cause the stock price to go down.”19 Is short selling really a disruptive
trading strategy hurting the formation of market stock prices? Not
necessarily.
18

Andrew R. Sorkin, Lehman Brothers Takes on Rumors by ‘The Shorts’, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,

2008.
19
Owen Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10659, 2004).
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Academic literature provides strong evidence showing that short
selling contributes to the efficiency of financial markets. Following
Fama’s insight, a market is efficient when prices “fully reflect available
information.”20 Three different forms of market efficiency might be
considered, depending on the types of information that are expected to be
incorporated into stock prices: a “weak” form where a security’s price
reflects all information conveyed by past prices; a “semi-strong” form
where a security’s price reflects all publicly available information; and a
“strong” form where a security’s price reflects all available information,
whether public or private.21 Gilson and Kraakman explain that markets
cannot be efficient in the “strong” form because the costs of acquiring
private, non-public information are too high.22 On the other hand,
mandatory disclosure rules make information about an issuer available to
investors at a very low cost. Investors act on information23 and a
security’s price therefore reflects such publicly available information,
strengthening the efficiency of financial markets in the semi-strong form.
There are also two aspects of market efficiency—informational
efficiency and allocational efficiency. Informational efficiency describes
how fast the information is incorporated into market prices. Allocational
efficiency describes the best allocation of resources in the market.24 Even
though all investors are given the very same information through
mandatory disclosure rules, investors have heterogeneous beliefs. While
long investors can be seen as optimistic (they expect the price of a
security to soar), short sellers can be deemed pessimistic (they expect the
price of a security to fall). Following Miller’s intuition, when investors
disagree about the value of a security, any constraints on informed
bearish short sellers leads to overpriced securities.25 Without short sellers
acting on bad information, a security’s price does not fully reflect
available information and financial markets can no longer be deemed
20
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21
Id.
22
See Ronald Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 607 (1984).
23
Ray Ball, The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What Have We
Learned?, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 10 (2009) (This article argues that if investors do not act on
information, the market would no longer be efficient. The argument that no one should act on
information “confuses a statement about an equilibrium ‘after the dust settles’ and the actions
required to obtain that equilibrium.”).
24
JAMES COX, ROBERT HILLMAN & DONALD LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION –
CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (Aspen Publishers ed., 2009).
25
Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162
(1977).
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efficient. Therefore, promoting short selling is a way to promote market
efficiency. Moreover, most research also suggests that short sales ensure
a smooth functioning of financial markets. Particularly, short sellers
create liquidity when they sell, borrow, and repurchase securities on the
market. Market makers also use short selling to fill clients’ orders with
respect to securities that are not immediately available and thus provide
liquidity to the market. Short selling is also a commonly used hedging
strategy that insures the rest of a given portfolio against a decline in
stock prices. Finally, by giving the opportunity to pessimistic investors to
act on information, short selling mitigates the formation of market
bubbles.
However, researchers in behavioral economics found that stock
prices exhibit more volatility than suggested by the efficient market
hypothesis. As Shiller put it, “markets contain quite substantial
noise,”26 putting the state of equilibrium in jeopardy. Markets may be
prone to “irrational exuberance,”27 and therefore be irrationally unstable.
Regulation of short selling cannot ignore these critics.
G. The Case for Regulatory Action.
What is the rationale for government intervention? Why should short
selling be regulated in the first place? There is no evidence that short
sellers caused the Crisis or Lehman Brothers’ end. On the contrary, with
respect to Lehman Brothers, Warren Buffet suggested that blaming short
sellers was indicative of a failure to admit one’s own problem. 28
Likewise, Thomas Baxter, Jr., General Counsel of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, saw good cause in shorting Lehman29 and Richard
Posner has argued that “there was not enough short selling to alert the
market and the U.S. government to the weakness of the banks, in part
because . . . short selling is a risky investment strategy.”30 However, the
Crisis revealed at least one market failure that has to be fixed at the E.U.
level—market participants did not take the appropriate steps to shed light
on short selling. Opaqueness was a vast problem during the Crisis and
26 Robert Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
83, 90 (2003).
27
Id.
28
Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555,
(JMP), at 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).
29
Id.
30
RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM – THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION 147 (Harvard University Press ed., 2009).
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prompted many regulators to intervene in their own jurisdiction.
Regulating short selling at the E.U. level should harmonize the current
fragmented approach without jeopardizing market efficiency. E.U.
authorities should therefore shed light on short selling without
discouraging short sellers or allowing interference with market allocation
of resources. As Frankel put it:
[C]rises should not become an excuse for public policy that is
hasty or ill-informed, or that serves primarily the interests of the
policymakers themselves or of special interests. The response
must be appropriate and careful. It must be informed by the
longer term perspective offered in the lessons of historical
precedent, particularly regarding the fallibility of wellintentioned government intervention, and by an awareness of the
dangers identified in the theory of moral hazard.31
Against this background, we can now examine the Regulation’s
approach. The Regulation takes a tough stance on short selling, arguing
that it “could aggravate the downward spiral in the prices of shares,
notably in financial institutions, in a way which could ultimately threaten
their viability and create systemic risks.”32 More than four hundred years
after the Dutch authorities outlawed short selling, E.U. lawmakers are
still wary of short sellers. What it means for the efficiency of financial
markets within the European Union is uncertain, but there appears to be
some cause for concern.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY RULES
The Regulation promotes transparency of short selling using two
different sets of rules: a two-tier disclosure regime of net short positions
(A), and considering the marking of orders as short sales (B).
A. Two-Tier Disclosure Regime of Net Short Positions

31

Frankel, supra note 1, at 165.
The fear that short selling could create systemic risks is mentioned three times at the very
beginning of the Regulation. Regulation, supra note 2, at
32
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For companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a trading
venue (that is, a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility33 in the
European Union), the Regulation provides for a two-tier model for
transparency of net short positions relying on private notifications to the
regulator and disclosures to the public. In comparison, since the
expiration of “Form SH Order” on August 1, 2009,34 the SEC is relying
on several Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) to increase
transparency surrounding short selling activity. SROs provide website
disclosures with respect to daily aggregate short selling volume in each
individual security and anonymized information regarding individual
short sales transactions on a one-month delayed basis. The appointed
SROs are BATS Exchange, Direct Edge Holdings, FINRA, International
Securities Exchange, NASDAQ Stock Market, NASDAQ OMX BX,
National Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Amex, and
NYSE Arca. The SEC also discloses bimonthly the aggregate net balance
of shares that failed to be delivered as of a particular settlement date.
This fails-to-deliver data is disclosed on the SEC website for all equity
securities.35
1. Prelude: What is a Net Short Position?
Under Article 3(4) of the Regulation, a net short position is obtained
by deducting any “long position” from any “short position.”36 Holding a
share creates a long position while short selling a share creates a short
position. The Regulation goes further to prevent traders from

33
See Article 4(1)(15) of the Directive 2004/39 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of April 21, 2004 on Markets of Financial Instruments, explaining that “multilateral trading facility”
means a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which brings
together multiple third‐party buying and selling interests in financial instruments—in the system and
in accordance with non‐discretionary rules—in a way that results in a contract in accordance with
the provisions of Title II of the Directive.
34
On September 18, 2008, the SEC issued an emergency order, the "Form SH Order." Form
SH required institutional investment managers that exercise "investment discretion" with respect to
accounts holding "section 13(f) securities" (i.e., equity securities of a class described in section
13(d)(1) of the Act that are admitted to trading on a national securities exchange or quoted on the
automated quotation system of a registered securities association) having an aggregate value of at
least $100,000,000 to file Form SH with the SEC. Form SH was filed electronically on the last
business day of every week immediately following a week in which the manager effected short sales.
Form SH required the disclosure of the gross number of the securities sold short during the day.
35
The short sale volume and transaction data are available at
http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsalevolume.htm. The fails-to-deliver data are available at
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Takes
Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency (July 27, 2009), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm.
36 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 3(4).
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circumventing the law using options, futures, contract for differences,
and credit default swaps, even if such alternative strategies are usually
costlier for traders. Therefore, entering into a transaction which creates
or relates to a financial instrument and confers a financial advantage in
the event of a decrease (or increase) in the price of the share is deemed to
create a short (or long) position.37 As a consequence, traders will not be
able to use strategies based on the put-call parity (which involves buying
a put, writing a call, and selling a bond to obtain the same payoff as
shorting a security in efficient capital markets).38 The transparency
regime is also designed to cover over-the-counter short selling, as long as
a net short position is created with respect to shares admitted to trading
on a trading venue in the European Union. Appropriately, the two-tier
disclosure regime applies whether short sellers, either natural or legal
persons, are residing or established within or outside the European
Union.
Short sellers are required to quickly notify or disclose net short
positions. The calculation of a net short position shall be made at
midnight at the end of the trading day and the notification or disclosure
shall be made by 15:30 hours (3:30 p.m.) on the next trading day.39 Such
a short notice requirement seems fundamental because a lot of short
positions are short term and the notification or disclosure of closed-out
short positions is of little interest. In the notification or disclosure form,
short sellers shall list their identity (more on this later), the size of the
relevant position, the targeted issuer, and the date on which the relevant
position was created, changed, or ceased to be held.40
This transparency model does not apply to all short sales in shares.
First, it does not apply to shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in
the European Union when the principal venue for the shares (that is, the
venue with the highest turnover) is outside the European Union.41
Second, it does not apply to market-making activities, pursuant to which
an investment firm or credit institution acts as principal in a financial
instrument.42 Market-making activities include (i) posting firm,
simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size and at competitive
37

Id. arts. 3(1)–3(2).
C(t) + K.B(t, T) = P(t) +S(t) ; And -S(t) = P(t) – C(t) – K.B(t), With: C(t) the value of the
call at time t, P(t) the value of the put at time t, S(t) the value of the security, K the strike price, B(t,
T) the value of the bond maturing at time T.
39
Regulation, supra note 2, art. 9(2).
40
Id. art. 9(1).
41
Id. art. 16(1).
42
Id. art. 17(1).
38
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prices, with the result of providing liquidity on a regular and ongoing
basis to the market; (ii) fulfilling orders, as part of the usual business,
initiated by clients or in response to clients’ requests to trade; and (iii)
hedging positions arising out of those dealings.43
Third, it does not apply to short sales entered into or net short
positions created in relation to the carrying out of a stabilization scheme
under a specific commission regulation.44 This regulation emphasizes
that “stabilization transactions mainly have the effect of providing
support for the price of an offering of relevant securities during a limited
time period if they come under selling pressure, thus alleviating sales
pressure generated by short term investors and maintaining an orderly
market in the relevant securities.”45 Since short selling does not provide
support for a security’s price, does this exemption really make sense?
During a significant offering, when the number of relevant securities is
not sufficient to satisfy all potential investors, an underwriter can, as
provided in the underwriting agreement, short sell the relevant securities
so that the underwriter could accept a number of purchases greater than
the number of securities initially offered (overallotment facility). The
underwriter is at risk like any short seller if the price of the securities
soars. However, such risk is limited because the issuer usually grants the
underwriter an option to purchase up to a certain amount of relevant
securities at the offer price for a certain period of time after the offer (a
green shoe option). The exercise of overallotment and green shoe options
are deemed “ancillary stabilization.”46 Therefore, short sales can be part
of a stabilization scheme and the exemption of the Regulation makes
sense.
2. Notification of Net Short Positions
Article 5 of the Regulation requires a short seller who has a net short
position to notify the relevant competent authority whenever this position
reaches or falls below 0.2 percent of the issued share capital of the
company. A short seller shall also provide notification for every
increment of 0.1 percent by which the position increases. The relevant
43

Id. art. 2(1)(k).
Commission Regulation 2273/2003, Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as Regards Exemptions for Buy-Back Programmes and Stabilisation
of Financial Instruments, art. 2(12), 2003 O.J. (L 336) 33, 35.
45
Id. at 34.
46
Id. at 35.
44
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competent authorities are to be officially designated by each Member
State for the purpose of the Regulation.47
This notification should be of great interest for financial market
authorities. It will provide them with adequate data to monitor short
selling and bring enforcement actions under the Market Abuse
Directive.48 This notification system will also enable financial market
authorities to compile statistics about short selling. The data will be
accurate because the notification requirement covers net short positions
created by trading shares not only on trading venues but also on over-thecounter markets. Moreover, notification of net short positions, which
take into account long positions used to close out short sales, is more
accurate than the disclosure of gross short positions in assessing the
potential risks stemming from short sellers’ activity. The costs associated
with this notification requirement could be dissuasive and limit short
selling activity. However, short sellers already calculate their net short
positions for the purpose of monitoring risks and exposure. Even though
short sellers could be required to amend their calculation methods to
comply with the Regulation, marginal costs would be limited and largely
outweighed by the benefits derived from the notification requirement.
3. Public Disclosure of Net Short Positions
Article 6 of the Regulation requires short sellers who have a net short
position to publicly disclose details of the position whenever it reaches or
falls below 0.5 percent of the issued share capital of the company. Each
0.1 percent above that threshold shall also be disclosed to the public.
This disclosure threshold is much lower than the disclosure threshold for
long positions, which is set at 5 percent in both the European Union49
and the United States.50
Public disclosure of net short positions by short sellers will lower the
information acquisition costs of other market participants. Following
47
Regulation, supra note 2, art. 32. Certainly, the French AMF, the German Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin), the Spanish Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(CNMV), the Italian Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), the Hellenic
Capital Market Commission (HCMC), etc.
48
Directive 2003/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.
49
Directive 2004/109 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on
the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose
Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, art.
9.1, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, 47.
50
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2011).
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Gilson and Kraakman, this will strengthen market efficiency in its semistrong form. The incorporation of information into market prices will
become faster because whenever a net short position held by a short
seller reaches or falls below the 0.5 percent threshold, all other market
participants will receive this information the following business day and
will be able to act on this information.
Still, such a requirement raises some serious concerns. Since short
sellers must disclose their identity, a herdlike behavior will arise (that is,
the disclosure of well-known managers’ positions will lead other market
participants to adopt the same strategy). This irrational aspect of
financial markets is well-developed in behavioral finance as a critique of
the efficient capital market hypothesis. In his seminal book, Shiller
explains how “[such] behavior, although individually rational, produces
group behavior that is, in a well-defined sense, irrational.”51 As a result,
all market participants will follow the trend set by star managers, and
market movements will no longer reflect the fundamental value of
companies’ equity.
Furthermore, public disclosure of net short positions and
identification of short sellers will facilitate retaliation by issuers,
including belligerent statements, legal actions, and short squeezes, even
when short selling is justified by the underlying financial situation of any
given company. Such risks would deter short sellers from acting and
would undermine market efficiency. As a result, investors will invest less
in markets where public disclosure is required and begin to allocate
capital to markets “with more palatable regulatory frameworks.”52 The
fear that regulation will unduly interfere with market allocation of
resources materializes here.
An alternative solution was suggested by the AIMA53 and in the
Report of the European Parliament that could have alleviated these fears
without calling into question the benefit of public disclosure for market
efficiency. The alternative solution was that the public disclosure of net
short positions should not identify the holder of the net short position
(that is, the public disclosure should be made in an anonymous form).
51

ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (Princeton University Press ed., 2005).
Oliver Wyman, The Effects of Short Selling Public Disclosure Regimes on Equity Markets –
A Comparative Analysis of US and European Markets at 29 (2010), available at
.http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/OW_EN_FS_PUBL_2010_Short_Selling.pdf.
53
Alternative Investment Management Association, Position Paper on the European
Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default
Swaps, 7 (Dec. 2010) (position paper), available at
http://www.aima.org/en/knowledge_centre/regulatory-and-tax/position-papers.cfm.
52
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Indeed, this solution could have alleviated the fears of herding and
retaliation.
B. Toward the Implementation of a Marking Regime?
In addition to the transparency regime, the Commission is invited to
consider, in the context of the revision of the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive, whether inclusion by investment firms of
information about short sales in transaction reports to competent
authorities would provide useful supplementary information to enable
competent authorities to monitor levels of short selling. Such a
requirement would enable market authorities to gain information about
intraday short sales.
In the United States, Rule 200(g) of Regulation SHO requires
brokers or dealers to mark all sell orders of any equity security as “long,”
“short,” or “short exempt.”54
The implementation of a marking regime would raise serious
concerns. The benefits stemming from such a requirement are limited
because the requirement does not cover over-the-counter short sales and
cannot be used to evaluate the outstanding short positions in the market
or spot any large short position.55 The picture will be incomplete and
misleading. Moreover, the implementation of a marking regime will be
highly costly. According to the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA):
[W]ork carried out by the FSA indicates that a flagging regime
would be prohibitively expensive to introduce. The limited
benefits that it would bring would not justify the very high
implementation and compliance costs (which could be as high as
£2m per firm according to responses to a survey we conducted in
2009).56
These costs will be particularly high in the European Union because only
Greece already has the infrastructures required to implement a marking

54

17 C.F.R. § 242.200(g) (2012).
Report of Committee of European Securities Regulators, Model for a Pan-European Short
Selling Disclosure Regime, at 6, CESR/10-088 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/10_088.pdf..
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Alternative Investment Management Association, supra note 49, at 8.
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regime. The costs will be high for both short sellers and trading venues.57
A marking regime does not withstand a sensible cost-benefit analysis.
III. REGULATION OF UNCOVERED OR NAKED SHORT SALES
The Regulation requires all short sellers to comply with a “locate”
requirement (A). Moreover, the Regulation designs specific buy-in
procedures (B).
A. “Locate” Requirement
Under Article 12 of the Regulation, a short seller may enter into a
short sale only of a share admitted to trading on a trading venue if (i) she
borrowed the share or made alternative provisions resulting in a similar
legal effect; (ii) she entered into an “agreement” to borrow the share or
has another absolutely enforceable claim under contract or property law
to obtain ownership of a corresponding number of securities of the same
class so that settlement can be effected when it is due; or (iii) she has
confirmed that the share has been located and took “measures” vis-à-vis
a third party necessary to have a “reasonable expectation” that settlement
can be effected when it is due.58
When, prior to a short sale in shares, a short seller borrowed the
share or entered into an agreement to borrow the share, the short sale is
“covered” and there is no settlement risk. On the other hand, when a
short seller has “reasonable expectation” that settlement can be effected
only when it is due, the short sale is “uncovered” or “naked,” and there is
settlement risk on delivery date. Under this “locate” approach, a short
seller shall perform the “locate” prior to executing a short sale, and a
corresponding “locate” shall be matched to each short sale. Initially, the
European Commission considered the implementation of a “locate and
reserve” requirement pursuant to which a short seller must at least have
an arrangement with a third party under which the third party has
confirmed that the share has been located and reserved for lending. The
implementation of such requirement would have outlawed uncovered or
naked short selling, usually classified as manipulative per se because
short sellers can short sell more than 100 percent of the issued share

57
58

Committee of European Securities Regulators, supra note 50, at 6.
Regulation, supra note 2, art. 12.
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capital of a company, dramatically increasing the downward pressure on
a particular security and the risk of settlement failures.59
The manner in which short sellers could satisfy the “reasonable
expectation” requirement will be determined by the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA), taking into account the intraday trading
and the liquidity of the shares. In the United States, Rule 203(b)(1) of
Regulation SHO, which requires broker-dealers to borrow or “locate”
securities before any short sales, allows reliance upon blanket assurances
or so-called “easy to borrow” lists to comply with the locate requirement
without directly contacting the source of the borrowed security.60
Naked short selling is not outlawed. However, manipulative or
abusive naked short selling is still subject to investigation and
enforcement actions brought by regulators pursuant to the Market Abuse
Directive.61 As Gruenewald, Wagner, and Weber observed, “naked short
selling is not actually a special case compared to conventional short
selling in terms of its economic implications” and does not require
specific regulatory impediments.62
Moreover, there is no need to rule out non-manipulative and nonabusive short selling because the risk of settlement failure is efficiently
addressed by buy-in procedures and fines for late settlement.
B. Buy-In Procedures
Under Article 15 of the Regulation, a central counterparty in a
Member State that provides clearing services for shares shall monitor
whether a short seller fails to deliver the shares within four business days
after the day on which settlement is due. If not, procedures are
automatically triggered for the buy-in of the shares to ensure delivery for
settlement. When the central counterparty is not able to buy-in the
shares, an amount is paid to the buyer based on the value of the shares to

59

Id.
17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b)(1) (2012). In the draft implementing technical standards submitted
by the ESMA to the Commission, the ESMA also referred to “easy to borrow” shares.
61
Seraina Gruenewald, Alexander Wagner, & Rolf Weber, Short Selling Regulation after the
Financial Crisis – First Principles Revisited, 7 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 108, 129
(2010).
62
Id. at 129–30. However, in addition to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, a naked short selling antifraud rule. Under Rule 10b21, it is unlawful for any person to submit an order to sell a security if that person deceives a brokerdealer, participant of a registered clearing agency, or purchaser regarding his/her intention, or ability,
to deliver the security by settlement date and that person fails to deliver the security by settlement
date.
60
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be delivered at the delivery date, plus an amount for losses incurred by
the buyer as a result of the settlement failure. The short seller will
reimburse all amounts paid.
These buy-in procedures are not an incentive for short sellers to
recklessly engage in naked short selling because short sellers who fail to
deliver the shares by the settlement date have the obligation to make
daily payments for each day the failure continues. These payments or
fines for late settlement “shall be sufficiently high to act as a deterrent to
natural or legal persons failing to settle.”63 The buy-in procedures and
fines will efficiently deter naked short sellers from failing to deliver
because they will be worse off once the central counterparty acts.
In the United States, close-out requirements focus on participants of
a clearing agency and broker-dealers. Under Rule 204(a) and (b) of
Regulation SHO, if a participant of a registered clearing agency has a
“fail to deliver”64 relating to a short sale with respect to any equity
securities, the participant must immediately close out the position by
either borrowing or purchasing the shares before the beginning of trading
hours on the first settlement day after the settlement date. Moreover, the
participant and any broker-dealer from which it receives trades become
subject to the so-called “pre-borrow penalty.”65 This requires the
participant to first borrow or arrange to borrow the security before
accepting any short sales orders or effecting short sales for its own
account in the security, until the “fail to deliver” is closed out by
purchasing (not borrowing) the relevant security. Because Rule 204
applies to all equity securities, it eliminates the close-out requirement for
“threshold securities” (that is, securities that experience large and
persistent failures to deliver) under Rule 203(b)(3) of Regulation SHO.66
Buy-ins and fines for late settlement are necessary to mitigate risks
of settlement failure resulting from “naked” short sales. Moreover,
relying on buy-in procedures and fines for late settlement is a better
alternative to prevent settlement disruption than an outright ban on
“naked” short selling through the implementation of a “locate and
reserve” requirement. First, the “locate and reserve” requirement would
restrict all naked short sales whereas the buy-in procedures and fines
discriminate by targeting only short sellers who fail to deliver. Second,
the “locate and reserve” requirement would “suck liquidity out of the
63

Regulation, supra note 2, art. 15(2).
17 C.F.R. § 272.204 (a)–(b)
65
Id.
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Id.
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market, pushing up the cost of borrowing, leading to hoarding of
securities.”67 Every short seller contemplating a covered or naked short
sale would suffer from this liquidity drain and escalation in borrowing
costs. On the other hand, the buy-in procedures and fines are painful only
for short sellers who fail to deliver. Third, even if the buy-in procedures
are costly for a buyer who faces the risk of late delivery or cash
compensation instead of delivery of the purchased security, the costs of
the “locate and reserve” requirement would be far greater for both short
sellers (because of high borrowing costs, hoarding of security, and
liquidity drain) and buyers (because of liquidity drain).
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF CIRCUIT BREAKER RULES
Once circuit breaker rules are triggered by either “exceptional
situations” or a “significant fall in price” (A), there is some cause for
concern because of a foreseeable lack of coordination (B), and a
potentially disruptive impact on the efficiency of financial markets (C).
A. Triggering Events: “Exceptional Situations” and a
“Significant Fall in Price”
The Regulation implements new curbs to prevent short selling in
battered stocks. In case of adverse events or developments (“exceptional
situations” which constitute a serious threat to financial stability and
market confidence) or a significant fall in price, the competent authority
of each Member State has far-reaching powers of intervention to require
further transparency or to impose restrictions on short selling.68 In the
European Commission’s own words, adverse events or developments
include “not just financial or economic events but also for example
natural disasters or terrorist acts.”69 With respect to a significant fall in
price, pursuant to Article 23(5) of the Regulation, a decline of 10 percent
or more in the case of a liquid share shall be deemed a significant fall in
price.70
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Alternative Investment Management Association, supra note 56, at 4.
Regulation, supra note 2, art. 1.
69
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling
and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, COM (2010) 482 final (Sept. 15, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/short_selling/20100915_proposal_en.pdf.
70 With respect to illiquid shares and other classes of financial instruments, the fall in value
shall be an amount specified by the Commission.
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In exceptional situations, the competent authority has the power to
require further transparency of net short positions in relation to a specific
financial instrument or class of financial instruments (of which
transparency is not already required under Articles 5 to 8 of the
Regulation) reaching or falling below a notification threshold fixed by
the competent authority.71 The competent authority may also prohibit or
impose conditions relating to persons entering into a short sale or other
transaction that creates, or relates to, a financial instrument that confers a
financial advantage on the person in the event of a decrease in the price
or value of another financial instrument.72 These measures may apply to
transactions concerning all financial instruments, financial instruments of
a specific class, or a specific financial instrument.73 Restrictions will be
valid for an initial period not exceeding three months but will be
renewable for further periods limited to three months at a time (Article
24 of the Regulation).74
Where the price of a financial instrument on a trading venue is
experiencing significant downward price pressure, the competent
authority shall consider whether it is appropriate to prohibit or restrict
short sellers from engaging in short selling of the financial instrument on
the trading venue or otherwise limit transactions in that financial
instrument on that trading venue “in order to prevent a disorderly decline
in the price of the financial instruments.”75 This measure applies for the
rest of the day (First Trading Day) and the following day (Second
Trading Day). If, at the end of the Second Trading Day, there is a further
significant fall in value from the closing price of the First Trading Day
(that is, 5 percent or more for liquid shares),76 the competent authority
may renew the measure for a further period of two trading days after the
end of the Second Trading Day.77
On February 24, 2010, the SEC adopted a new circuit breaker rule
(the so-called alternative uptick rule) that places price restrictions on
short selling when a stock is experiencing significant downward price
pressure. When a security’s price declines by 10 percent or more from
the prior day’s closing price, Rule 201 of Regulation SHO prevents the
71
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to Article 23(5) of the Regulation.
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execution or display of a short sale order of a “covered security” at a
price that is less than or equal to the current national best bid.78 On
March 13, 2011, 54 securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the NYSE Amex triggered the circuit breaker, dragged by a
significant fall in Japan’s Nikkei Stock Average amid widespread
worries about the impact of the 9.0 earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and
the nuclear power catastrophe. In particular, short selling was curbed in
U.S.-listed shares of Hitachi, Cameco Corporation, Uranium Resources,
and Uranium Energy Corporation.79
B. Foreseeable Lack of Coordination
At first glance, the Regulation seems to design an efficient
supervisory framework that harmonizes and coordinates Members
States’ interventions.
Before implementing or renewing any measure required to face
exceptional situations and before imposing any other measure required to
confront a significant fall in price, any given competent authority
(Primary Competent Authority) shall notify its E.U. counterparts and the
ESMA.80 This notification shall include details about the classes of
instruments and transactions targeted by the measure as well as evidence
supporting the implementation of such measure and its proposed
effective date.81 Upon receipt of such notification, each E.U. competent
authority may decide to take any measure within its own jurisdiction it
deems necessary to assist the Primary Competent Authority, in
accordance with Articles 18 to 23 of the Regulation. E.U. capital markets
being highly intertwined, this assistance is crucial to ensure the
effectiveness of any measure contemplated by the Primary Competent
Authority. However, one might worry (more on this in a moment) that
other competent authorities will always succeed in finding a colorable
78
Rule 201 of Regulation SHO defines “covered security” to mean any “NMS stock.” Rule
600(b)(47) of Regulation NMS defines an “NMS stock” as “any NMS security other than an option.”
See 17 C.F.R. § 242.201(a)(1) (2012). Rule 600(b)(46) of Regulation NMS defines an “NMS
security” as “any security or class of securities for which transaction reports are collected, processed,
and made available pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan, or an effective national
market system plan for reporting transactions in listed options.” See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(46)
(2012). The circuit breaker will therefore affect all securities, except options, traded on an exchange
or over the counter.
79
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NEWSWIRES, Mar. 14, 2011.
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argument as to the “necessity” to follow the Primary Competent
Authority and intervene in their own jurisdiction, even in the absence of
any exceptional situation or significant fall in price, bypassing the
original impediments of Articles 18 to 23 of the Regulation.
The Regulation entrusts the ESMA with “a facilitation and
coordination role” as to measures taken by E.U. competent authorities.
Under Article 27(1) of the Regulation, the “ESMA shall ensure that a
consistent approach is taken by competent authorities regarding measures
taken under Section 1 Powers of competent authorities especially
regarding when it is necessary to use powers of intervention under
Section 1, the nature of any measures imposed and the commencement
and duration of any measures.”82 In particular, after receiving notification
of measures to be imposed or renewed because of an “exceptional
situation,”83 the ESMA shall issue an opinion, published on its website
within 24 hours, on whether the measure or proposed measure is
necessary to address the situation.84 Specifically, the ESMA shall address
whether the adverse events or developments constitute “a serious threat
to financial stability or to market confidence in one or more Member
States, whether the measure or proposed measure is appropriate and
proportionate to address the threat, and whether the proposed duration of
any such measure is justified.”85 However, the thrust of the ESMA’s
opinions is not far-reaching. Indeed, E.U. competent authorities shall
only comply or explain:
Where a competent authority proposes to take or takes measures
contrary to an ESMA opinion under Article 27(2) or declines to
take measures contrary to an ESMA opinion under that article
it shall publish on its website within 24 hours of receiving the
ESMA opinion a notice fully explaining its reasons for doing
so.86
Therefore, the ESMA does not have the legal authority to prevent E.U.
competent authorities from implementing, at their sole discretion,
incoherent approaches throughout the European Union.
82
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The Regulation is so prone to tilt the playing field against short
sellers that it empowers the ESMA with its own powers of intervention.
The ESMA can require enhanced disclosure of net short positions,
prohibit or constrain short selling and prevent either natural or legal
persons from entering into certain transactions relating to a financial
instrument in two situations.87 The first occurs when there is a threat to
the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the
stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the European
Union with cross border implications. The second occurs when a
competent authority or competent authorities have not taken measures to
address the threat or measures that have been taken do not adequately
address the threat. Before taking those measures, the ESMA shall
consult, when appropriate, the European Systemic Risk Board and other
relevant authorities.88 According to Article 28(3) of the Regulation, the
ESMA shall also take into account the extent to which the measure:
(a) significantly addresses the threat to the orderly functioning
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or
part of the financial system in the Union or will significantly
improve the ability of competent authorities to monitor the
threat; (b) does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage; (c) does
not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial
markets, including by reducing liquidity in those markets or
creating uncertainty for market participants, that is
disproportionate to the benefits of the measure.89
This analysis reveals that the Regulation suggests requiring stricter
constraints on the ESMA’s intervention powers than on other E.U.
competent authorities. This seems to be incoherent with the Regulation’s
primary objective (that is, designing a consistent and harmonized
approach to short selling in the European Union).90
The Regulation gives legal authority to every E.U. competent
authority to interfere with market mechanisms, without entrusting the
ESMA with real harmonizing powers. Incoherent temporary restrictions
on short selling might thrive, which is even more worrisome considering
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the true impact of temporary restrictions on the functioning of capital
markets.
C. Negative Consequences of Temporary Restrictions
Academic literature provides strong evidence that short selling is not
responsible for market volatility or negative market moves and that short
selling constraints are highly disruptive.
In December 2008, the SEC Office of Economic Analysis issued a
memorandum to Christopher Cox, then-Chairman of the SEC, describing
short selling activity during the first weeks of September 2008, just
before the implementation of a short sale ban on financial stocks. The
analysis suggests that during periods of extreme negative returns, “sell
pressure is more intense for long trades indicating that short sales put less
pressure on prices than other sales during periods of extreme negative
returns.”91 This suggests that a significant decrease in price in periods of
extreme negative returns might be a consequence of long investors’
actions rather than short sellers’ actions, which undermines the rationale
for government intervention.
In their study of the 2008 naked short sales restrictions in the United
States, Boulton and Braga-Alves show that short sale restrictions have a
negative impact on liquidity as bid-ask spreads widen and trading
volumes decrease.92 Moreover, they find no evidence that these
restrictions reduce volatility.93 On the contrary, they find that volatility
increases and conclude that market quality is affected during the
restricted period.94 What we should learn from this study is clear: short
sales constraints have a detrimental effect on market efficiency.
Beber and Pagano also suggested that short selling restrictions are
detrimental to liquidity (“especially for stocks with small market
capitalization, high volatility and no listed options”), slow the price
discovery process, and fail to support stock prices (except possibly for
U.S. financial stocks).95
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the 2007-09 Crisis (Aug. 2011) (unpublished working paper), available at
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As a consequence, E.U. competent authorities should restrain
themselves and admit that restricting short selling actually aggravates the
disorderly functioning of financial markets, even in the midst of a
financial crisis.

V. CONCLUSION
The Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit
Default Swaps will implement reasonable rules applicable to naked short
selling but will implement flawed transparency rules (specifically public
disclosure of short sellers’ identity and future implementation of a
marking regime). More seriously, this Regulation entrusts competent
authorities of Member States and the ESMA with far-reaching powers of
intervention. As a consequence, incoherent approaches will interfere with
market mechanisms, in particular with the price discovery process,
undermining the European Union’s competitiveness. The regulatory
patchwork that emerged during the Crisis will materialize again in the
future. As Tett observed,
“[A]n age of bureaucrat hubris creates new risks. History is
littered with examples where officials have tried to control
financial flows and set prices, with disastrous results. It would be
foolish to expect bureaucrats to be any less fallible today, given
that finance is doubly complex and bureaucrats (like bankers)
have warped incentives.”96
There are no atheists in foxholes. And there are no libertarians in crises.
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